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VOLUME 13 WINTER 1991 NUMBER 2
PROSPECTIVE FATHERS AND THEIR UNBORN
CHILDREN
Jeffrey A. Parness*
While significant national attention has recently been paid to vary-
ing questions about the legal duties of prospective mothers to their un-
born children, little comparable focus has been placed on the duties of
prospective fathers. Why the difference? Though men and women obvi-
ously participate differently in nurturing the development of potential
human life, there is much that both prospective parents can do to pro-
mote the well-being of their future offspring. This inattention to male
responsibilities not only undercuts prevailing governmental interests in
protecting potential life, but also may, at times, constitute prohibited
sex discrimination.
When attention has been paid to prospective fathers, the results
are usually disheartening. Treatment of men is often too lenient; yet, on
occasion, treatment is too harsh. Further, many times there is little cor-
relation between the legal duties of prospective mothers and fathers in
situations where their conduct is comparable.
This article seeks to prompt greater dialogue on the legal duties of
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Colby College; J.D., The University
of Chicago. The genesis of this article is a talk delivered at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Law
and Society Association in Berkeley, California.
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prospective fathers to their unborn children. In doing so, it employs a
recent case litigated in the courts of Florida and involving certain as-
pects of a prospective father's legal duties. The article utilizes the case,
as well as recent controversies over prebirth maternal duties, to suggest
some guidelines for establishing prebirth paternal duties. In particular,
it addresses paternal duties in settings involving criminal prosecution,
coercive civil laws, and involuntary termination of parental
rights-areas which to date have been significantly considered only for
prospective mothers. Finally, it examines additional prebirth paternal
duties in settings where there are no easy parallels to maternal conduct.
I. A TROUBLING CASE1
Richard and Mary met during the summer of 1985 in Tempe, Ari-
zona. Mary worked at a bank while raising a son born out of wedlock.
Richard had a lucrative sales job.
Soon, Mary was pregnant by Richard. At one time Mary had been
using birth control pills, but she failed to renew her prescription when
her supply ran out. When Mary learned of her pregnancy in December
1985, Richard was planning a ski trip for them. Richard then knew his
job was in jeopardy. Prior to the trip, Richard had saved about $9000.
Mary did not tell Richard about her pregnancy until the day
before departure. Richard opted not to discuss it then. Richard spent
about $4000 on the trip.
Upon return, Richard urged Mary to get an abortion. Mary re-
sisted, and Richard resisted efforts to change his mind. While Mary
saw herself as neither financially nor emotionally able to raise two chil-
dren alone, Richard believed he was not ready for marriage.
The following months were turbulent. Richard continued to live
comfortably, though he became unemployed and had to borrow money.
Mary lost her job at the bank. While she found other employment
three weeks later, she had to ask Richard for rent money. Mary also
1. This case is founded on the events in Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.
1989), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 405 (1989) (hereinafter Doe 11), as gleaned from some of the
appellate court briefs (which are on file with the author). [In other words, this is a "see if you
must" or "trust me, I've looked it up" footnote. Coombs, Lowering One's Cites, 76 VA. L. REV.
1099, 1109 (1990)]. This is not to say there were no facts in dispute in Doe. Matter of Adoption
of Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (hereinafter Doe 1) ("There are numer-
ous discrepancies between the natural mother's testimony at trial and the testimony concerning
her prior statements to social workers, friends, and professionals during her pregnancy with re-




Late in March 1986, Mary wrote to Richard's mother, saying
adoption was for her alone to decide. Richard discussed the letter with
his mother. He wrote to Mary in response:
I respect any decision you make but let's put the axe away. I hope
you'll think about our whole situation. I really would like to see my
child. I've never had a child before and it hurts me to think that he or
she would grow up thinking their father was a monster. No matter
what you take away from me, the child will still be part of me. I'll
still love the child no matter if I ever see it. Every time you look at
that child you'll see part of me there whether you like it or not. That's
a decision you and only you can make. I do hope for the very best for
you and my child.
By mid-April, Mary was out of full-time work again. She did some
babysitting, began receiving unemployment checks, and obtained food
stamps. Though Richard was out of work until May, during this time
he provided meals for Mary and her son; gave her furniture and
clothes; bought her milk and baby food; and paid insurance premiums
for Mary's son.
In July, Mary talked by phone with her mother in Florida. She
spoke of her predicament and desire for adoption. With Mary's permis-
sion, her mother contacted a local Tampa rabbi. Before long, Bob and
Jane Doe were told of Mary. The Does asked a Florida law office to
pursue possible adoption of Mary's child. The Does were middle-class,
married since 1975, childless, and unsuccessful in their attempts to
conceive a child. On July 19, 1986, Mary called one of the Does' attor-
neys. She told him the father of her child "wanted to have nothing to
do with her, the pregnancy or the baby," and had not provided support.
She said she was financially destitute. When the attorney asked for the
father's location, Mary said he would not cooperate. When the attorney
asked Mary where she wanted to have the baby, she said Tampa, Flor-
ida. The attorney stressed the seriousness of adoption. When asked
whether she still loved the father and would marry him, she responded,
"'No."
Mary left Phoenix for Florida on August 3rd. The Does provided
her with one-way airfare. In addition, the Does agreed to support Mary
financially from August 1st until a month after birth. Mary and her
son left Phoenix quietly, telling Richard by a letter channeled through
her sister, who was told not to reveal her whereabouts.
On August 8th, Mary phoned Richard, said she was in Florida,
19911
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and told him why. Afterwards, Mary and Richard frequently talked by
phone. Mary gave Richard only her Florida phone number. These
phone conversations chiefly concerned their relationship. Mary refused
to accept Richard's offer to return to Arizona at his expense and to live
with him outside of marriage. She told him that her unborn child
would be better off in a stable two-parent home.
On August 12th, Mary was interviewed by an officer of the Flor-
ida Human Rehabilitative Services (HRS). She was shown and she
read a form regarding consent to adoption. She was told about its irrev-
ocable nature and was cautioned not to sign it if she had doubts. Mary
told the agency officer that the father had never offered financial sup-
port, but that he did not deny paternity. The agency never contacted
Richard.
By early September, Mary had brought to the office of the Does'
attorneys a letter written by Richard. Dated August 18th, it asked that
Mary "at least think about" letting him raise his child, who he hoped
would look like him. Attorneys for the Does concluded that the letter
contained nothing which altered their assessment that Richard's con-
sent to an adoption was not mandated by the Florida Adoption Act.
They neither contacted Richard nor informed the Does of the letter.
Just prior to birth, Mary encountered new pressures. She sought
the counsel of a Roman Catholic nun who worked at BETA House, a
center for unwed mothers. Mary expressed to the nun doubts about the
adoption. On September 4th, Richard proposed marriage and Mary ac-
cepted. Mary bought a wedding dress and told her mother. She told
Richard she would keep the child, though she did not tell the Does,
HRS, or others. Richard and Mary talked about reimbursing the Does.
Richard later changed his mind. Mary then asked Richard to let her
alone decide about the child, and he did not say no.
During a later phone conversation, Richard urged Mary not to
sign any papers. Mary then determined she would keep the baby.
When she told her mother, however, her mother became angry and said
that Mary would have to fend for herself if there was no adoption.
Mary changed her mind again.
After John was born to Mary on September 12th, Mary unsuc-
cessfully tried to call Richard and her counselor at BETA House. She
also asked the hospital to contact a rabbi, but no one responded.
Early on Sunday morning, September 14th, Mary told a nurse she
did not wish to see John anymore. She took medicine to dry her breast
milk. Later that morning, two attorneys for the Does and a nurse
[Vol. 13:165
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watched Mary sign adoption papers, who later stated she knew what
she was signing, although she did not like it. Mary left the hospital that
day, and John left the next day with the Does.
Richard did not learn what happened until later when he was
called by an ex-girlfriend who was asked by Mary to give him the
news. He then called Mary, and proposed they get John back and get
married. Richard also called his mom saying: "Mother, can you believe
I have a son? I'm going to get it."
On September 17th, Richard called one of the Does' attorneys and
vowed to stop the adoption. Soon after, Richard flew to Florida with
baby clothes in hand. On September 18th, Mary cancelled her appoint-
ment with one of the Does' attorneys. On September 19th, Richard
filed an acknowledgement of paternity with the state of Florida and
signed John's birth certificate. Finally, on September 22nd, the Does
were told by one of their attorneys (who had received a call from Rich-
ard and Mary's attorney) about Richard and Mary's plans.
Bob and Jane Doe declined to relinquish John, and on October
22nd filed an adoption petition. Richard and Mary were married on
November 15th in Arizona.
A three-day, non-jury trial on the adoption petition was held in
May 1987 in Florida. A month later, the adoption was granted. The
court determined that Mary's written consent was valid and could not
be withdrawn absent clear and convincing evidence of fraud or duress.2
It rejected arguments that Mary had a right to withdraw consent any
time prior to a final adoption order.'
As for Richard, the court found that he had impliedly consented to
adoption by his prebirth conduct and, thus, was barred under Florida
law from urging that his written consent to an adoption was required.4
Specifically, it found Richard impliedly consented to adoption by fail-
ing to provide meaningful support to Mary during pregnancy despite
full knowledge of her pregnancy and poor financial condition.5 Further,
it held that Richard's written consent to the adoption was unnecessary
2. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1041.
3. Doe 11, 543 So. 2d at 744.
4. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1042.
5. Id. Incidentally, the relevant Florida statute makes no provision for other than a written
consent after birth. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West 1985). In the one case used by the trial court
where an unwritten consent by the father prior to birth was found sufficient to excuse the absence
of a written consent after birth, the father actually assented to the adoption. Wylie v. Botos, 416
So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982).
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because Richard had abandoned his developing child.6 The finding of
abandonment was grounded on Richard's failure to provide Mary with
meaningful, repetitive, and customary support before her consent to
adoption.'
Richard and Mary appealed. The intermediate appeals court con-
curred that Mary's consent was freely given and irrevocable.8 However,
because abandonment covered only children born alive,9 it held that
Richard's prebirth conduct could not constitute abandonment 0 and
that the adoption was void for want of Richard's written consent; con-
sent was needed because Richard had filed an acknowledgment of
paternity."
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decisions regarding Mary
in April 1989.11 Further, it ruled that Richard's prebirth conduct was
relevant to the determinative question of whether Richard had aban-
doned his living child, including the issue of whether Richard "evinced
a settled purpose to assume parental duties."'" The high court found
Richard's prebirth efforts and his efforts in the days following John's
6. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1042.
7. Id. In one of the precedents used by the trial court on the question of abandonment, the
issue of abandonment was never reached at the appellate level. Wylie, 416 So. 2d at 1256 n.3. But
see id. at 1256 (while not addressing the father's abandonment, by finding the father had done
nothing to require the adoptive parents to secure his consent, the court necessarily found the
father had not provided his child with "support in a repetitive, customary manner," FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.062(l)(b)(5) (West 1985)). Two other cases were used by the trial court, In re Adop-
tion of Mullenix, 359 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1978) (court implicitly found that natural
unmarried father failed to provide child with customary and repetitive support, with findings relat-
ing to both prebirth and postbirth conduct) and Hinkle v. Lindsey, 424 So. 2d 983 (Fla. Dist Ct.
App. 1983) (postbirth withholding of child support insufficient to establish abandonment in view
of other circumstances).
8. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1041.
9. Because the Florida statutory provision excusing the written consent of a parent in an
adoption case where the parent has abandoned his or her child contains no definition of abandon-
ment, the court utilized the statutory definition of abandonment in dependency and termination of
parental rights cases. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1044 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(1) (West 1985)).
10. Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1043-44 (though it cited to cases from three different states where
abandonment was found due to prebirth paternal conduct).
11. Id. at 1043, distinguishing Wylie, 416 So. 2d at 1255 (unlike Richard, the acknowledg-
ment of paternity by the father was filed after, not before, the adoption petition was filed). But see
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(l)(b)(4) (West 1985) (indicating an adoption petition may be granted
only if there is written consent by a father who has filed an acknowledgement of paternity, with-
out expressly indicating such an acknowledgment must be filed before the adoption petition is
filed) and Wylie, 416 So. 2d at 1256 n.2 (noting the need for legislative action to address the
unclear statutes).
12. Doe 11, 543 So. 2d at 744.
13. Id. at 746.
PROSPECTIVE FATHERS
live birth "marginal" and insufficient to show a "settled purpose" to
assume parental duties.14 Finding abandonment, the high court deter-
mined Richard's written consent to the adoption was not required. Af-
ter dismissing Richard's federal constitutional claims, 15 it upheld the
adoption. The U.S. Supreme Court declined requests to entertain the
controversy.16
This case is troubling in a number of ways. Certainly, questions
can be raised about Mary's consent, the financial arrangements be-
tween Mary and the Does, and the conduct of the Does' lawyers. This
article will employ the case to address only the conduct of prospective
fathers, however. This focus is prompted by both sympathy for Richard
and the view that the acknowledged prebirth paternal duty of support
was both too limited and too severe. More generally, focus on paternal
duties to the unborn seems appropriate given our recent preoccupation
with maternal duties-especially in criminal, compelled conduct, and
termination of parental rights cases.
How was Richard mistreated? The Florida high court found Rich-
ard had not "evinced a settled purpose to assume parental duties."17
Yet, the written laws did not expressly condition his notice of and par-
ticipation in the adoption process on such a purpose. 18 Further, there
was no consideration of whether the lack of a purpose to assume paren-
tal duties prior to birth can be overcome after birth by acts evincing
such a purpose. Finally, unmarried natural fathers, like Richard, still
14. Id. at 747; Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1042 (finding Richard abandoned his son during the
pregnancy and the first two days of his son's life after birth).
15. Doe 11, 543 So. 2d at 747-49 (due process and equal protection claims).
16. 110 S. Ct. 405 (1989).
17. Doe 1I, 543 So. 2d at 746.
18. In fact, Richard's postbirth written consent to the adoption of his son was necessary
before any adoption petition could be granted if Richard had either filed an acknowledgment of
paternity (which he did a month before the Does even petitioned for an adoption order) or pro-
vided his son "with support in a repetitive, customary manner" (which no Florida court found that
he failed to do), unless it was found he had abandoned his son. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.062(l)(b)(5) (West 1985). While the trial court found abandonment by Richard through
the pregnancy and for the first two days after birth, Doe 1, 524 So. 2d at 1042, findings to which
the supreme court paid "due deference," Doe 1I, 543 So. 2d at 747, neither court focused on
whether Richard later abandoned his abandonment (by acknowledging paternity, marrying Mary,
and contesting the adoption petition from the moment it was filed) nor on why Richard's evincing
a settled purpose to assume parental duties two days after birth and beyond was insufficient to
overcome the effects of his earlier conduct which amounted merely to "marginal" support. Com-
pare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.41(4)(b) (West 1988) (temporary suspension of parental rights must
be accompanied by reasonable effort to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child
from his home) and § 39.001 (West 1988) (legislative purpose is to preserve and strengthen the
child's family ties wherever possible).
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
have few clues on what prebirth paternal conduct will give rise to the
right to notice and a chance to be heard on their child's adoption.
How was the Florida high court's recognition of a prebirth duty of
paternal support too limited and too severe? Surely, the court was cor-
rect in finding in an adoption case that a prospective father has
prebirth responsibilities. Yet, was it too limited in finding such respon-
sibilities to be legally relevant only in adoption proceedings? If Mary
had kept her baby, should Richard's claims for visitation or custody be
determined without consideration of his prebirth conduct? And, if
Mary had determined Richard's marginal support was adversely affect-
ing her future child's well-being, should she be able to seek additional
help when it is most needed, that is, prior to birth? Finally, was it too
severe when, after finding Richard had abandoned John through Sep-
tember 17th, five days after birth, it failed to consider whether prebirth
and postbirth child abandonment can be overcome by a natural parent
whose conduct changes and who evinces a settled purpose to assume
parental duties before an adoption has been granted, or before an adop-
tion petition has even been filed?
II. PREBIRTH PATERNAL DUTIES
How can we recognize more fully the prebirth duties of potential
fathers while simultaneously doing justice to Richard, Mary, John, and
the Does? An examination of the recent controversy over women's
prebirth duties seems useful. As noted, the controversy has involved
criminal prosecution, court-compelled conduct, and involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights.
A. Criminal Prosecution
There has been much recent discussion of prosecuting women for
acts committed during pregnancy.19 In California in 1986, Pamela Rae
Stewart was charged with willfully omitting to furnish care to her
19. See e.g., Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy, 64 IND. L.
J. 357 (1988-89) (reviewing cases and urging restraints on the criminal prosecution of pregnant
women); Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Preg-
nant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. L. Rev. & SoC. CHANGE 277 (1987-88)
(same); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "'Fe-
tal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988) (same). Cf. Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987) (more sympa-
thetic to criminal prosecution).
[Vol. 13:165
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fetus.2 0 Specifically, during pregnancy Pamela allegedly disregarded
advice to discontinue amphetamine use, to abstain from sex, and to
seek medical aid. These acts were said to have contributed to her later-
born child's brain damage and death. In Florida in 1989, Jennifer
Johnson was convicted of delivering illegal drugs to her newborn child
through the umbilical cord."
Criminalization of certain conduct during pregnancy is not partic-
ularly troubling. 2 But, the relative lack of crimes for acts against the
unborn by non-mothers is disturbing. Such crimes are far less contro-
versial as they typically do not involve constitutional rights and they
promote both maternal and societal interests in securing live and
healthy births. Consider the 1970 case of Robert Keeler, whose wife,
Teresa, was pregnant by another man.2 3 Robert became "extremely up-
set" at seeing Teresa's abdomen and said: "I'm going to stomp it out of
you." He pushed her, shoved his knee into her abdomen, and hit her in
the face several times. Teresa fainted and Robert left. Teresa survived
but her fetus was stillborn. In California in 1970, Robert was not guilty
of homicide because there was no child born alive; in most states today,
-men like Robert remain innocent of homicide.2 Yet, his conduct seems
far more culpable than that of Pamela Rae Stewart or Jennifer John-
son. Criminalizing such non-maternal conduct against the unborn
seems warranted since pregnant women's, as well as general societal,
interests would be promoted.
5
Incidentally, in response to Keeler, the California legislature rede-
fined murder to include "killing of a human being, or a fetus."2 There-
after, Karl Andrew Smith caused his wife, Jolene, to miscarry during
20. The case is described in Note, Pregnancy Police, supra note 19, at 286-87.
21. The case is described in Brannigan, Mother Guilty of Delivering Drugs at Birth, The
Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1989, at B 8, col. 6.
22. Testimony of Jeffrey A. Parness, before the Subcommittee on Children, Families, Drugs
and Alcoholism of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources during a hearing
in Indianapolis, Indiana, on October 9, 1989, on maternal alcohol and drug abuse (copy available
from author).
23. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 625 (1970).
24. For critiques of the "born alive" rule, see, e.g., Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn:
Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGcS. 97, 1"27-36
(1985) and Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal
Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1987).
25. Parness, supra note 24, at 98-102 (reviewing varying interests which may be involved
when the state protects potential human life).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
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her fourth month.27 Angered by Jolene's extramarital affair, Karl
choked, hit, and kicked Jolene while saying he did not want the baby to
live and shouting "Bleed, baby, bleed." Karl was found not guilty of
murder in 1976 as the new California law was deemed by a court ap-
plicable only to viable fetuses.2 8  Since then, the law remains
unchanged .29
Returning to Richard and Mary, related issues involve the circum-
stances under which the likes of Richard should be prosecuted for fail-
ing to provide adequate prenatal support. The issues are not easy. Yet,
is it not surprising that we hear so little about the adverse effects on
future children caused by men's conduct and so much about women's
prenatal drug use? Are the consequences on the unborn, or the social
concerns about the conduct, so dramatically different? Think but for a
moment about the abuse of pregnant women like Teresa Keeler and
Jolene Smith.
Criminal prosecution of potential fathers is possible under the Cal-
ifornia law used against Pamela Rae Stewart. That act says, in part:
"If a parent of a minor child willfully omits ...to furnish necessary
• ..care . . .he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor .... A child con-
ceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person .... 30 The
court dismissed charges against Pamela because it found the act cov-
ered only financial support.3 1 Seemingly, the act would apply to Rich-
ard's "marginal support" of Mary during her pregnancy. Such a hold-
ing would be troubling, however, in that the statutory purpose seems
better accomplished in' other ways. Criminalizing Richard's expendi-
tures of $4000 for the ski trip just does not seem warranted. Yet,
27. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
28. In reaching its decision, the California appellate court did not rely upon legislative in-
tent; rather, it was guided by a fundamental misunderstanding of the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1970). See Parness, supra note 24, at 112-13 (criticizing the court's rationale); State v.
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) (rejecting the argument that the holding in Roe
forecloses a state from protecting by criminal laws both embryos and nonviable fetuses).
29. While California has not extended its homicide law protections to all unborn, some
states have. See, e.g.. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-609.2663 (West 1987) (varying degrees of
murder of unborn child, defined as "unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet
born") and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, % 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (homicide of an unborn
child, defined as any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth). Note that
Minnesota and Illinois did not follow California in combining the born and the unborn in a single
criminal law provision, but rather maintain separate criminal law provisions for the born and the
unborn.
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
31. Note, Pregnancy Police, supra note 19, at 287 n.64.
[Vol. 13:165
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application of the statute to Robert Keeler or Karl Smith seems pre-
cluded, as neither case involved finances. The failure to criminalize the
conduct of Keeler and Smith is also troubling. Other effective means of
deterrence and punishment seem unavailable. Attacks on the unborn by
the likes of Keeler and Smith undermine not only societal interests in
potential human life but also the individualized, and very significant,
interests of pregnant women in securing live and healthy births.
B. Preventing Harm by Coercion
Besides crimes, there has been much recent discussion of coercive
governmental action against pregnant women to prevent harm to the
unborn.32 On occasion, as with blood transfusions3 3 and caesarean sec-
tions,3 courts have been asked to order involuntary medical treatment
for a pregnant woman to promote the woman's and fetus' health.
Sometimes, courts have even been asked to protect a fetus though the
mother's well-being will be impaired. 5 Comparably, courts struggle
when asked to protect the unborn by coercing such non-medical con-
duct as drug counselling and rehabilitation.
36
32. See Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1525-84 (1990) (reproductive technologies and state intervention during pregnancy); Field,
Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989);
Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Caesareans, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (over religious objections, blood transfusions
ordered to save viable fetus and mother).
34. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga., 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981) (caesarean section ordered despite pregnant woman's religious objections where without
the procedure there was a 99-100% chance of fetal death and a 50% chance of maternal death
and where with the procedure there was nearly a 100% chance both would survive).
35. See, e.g, In re A.C., D.C. Ct. App. (en banc), No. 87-609 (April 26, 1990), as reported
in 58 U.S.L.W. 2644 (May 8, 1990) (a "case of an incompetent pregnant patient whose own life
may be shortened by a caesarean section, and whose unborn child's chances of survival may hang
on the court's decision").
36. Both civil and criminal courts have been presented with such requests. See Matter of
Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (probate court reads probate code on child
custody not to include the unborn, but declares that amendments are desirable); In re Steven S.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (superior court decides pregnant woman could
not be detained because her unborn child was a dependent child under the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code); Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, 74 A.B.A. J. 20 (1988) (pregnant woman convicted of
theft is sent to jail until her child is born because she had a cocaine problem); see also MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 253 B.05, 626.5561 (West Supp. 1990) (emergency admission to treatment facility
of pregnant drug-using woman who refuses or fails recommended treatment).
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Obviously, a man can not be similarly coerced to help his unborn
offspring. Yet, various forms of coercion against men can protect po-
tential human life. One form involves a court in a prebirth paternity
action ordering financial or other support. While many states permit a
prebirth paternity action, significant proceedings are typically stayed
until after birth.37 Such stays are usually either automatic 8 or at the
man's request.39 In North Carolina, a postbirth establishment of pater-
nity of a child born out of wedlock does trigger a man's responsibility
"for medical expenses incident to the pregnancy and the birth of the
child."' 0 Preferable, however, is the Arkansas law authorizing a pater-
nity court to make "temporary orders ... pending ... birth;" if a final
order differs, "judgment is rendered against the mother for the amount
paid."' 1 In Delaware, a prebirth paternity action is automatically
stayed until after birth, except for "support proceedings."' 2 Prebirth
support orders help the unborn in ways somewhat comparable to orders
of maternal surgery, drug rehabilitation, and the like. Yet, they less
frequently trigger thorny constitutional issues."3
With Mary and Richard, either could have benefitted from a
prebirth paternity action. Mary might have sued to reduce her financial
difficulties, to access better nourishment for her future child, or to
lessen the pressures for adoption. Richard might have sued to show his
concern for Mary and their future child, perhaps evincing thereby "a
settled purpose to assume parental duties."
Undoubtedly, there are difficulties with imposing an unmitigated
support obligation on absent, especially involuntarily absent, prospec-
tive fathers. The level of prebirth paternal support should reflect the
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-160 (West Supp. 1990) ("proceedings to estab-
lish paternity of a child born or conceived out of lawful wedlock") and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.011
(West Supp. 1990) ("Any woman who is pregnant ... may bring proceedings ... to determine
the paternity of the child . . ."). Compare IDAHO CODE § 7-1107 (1990) ("Proceedings to estab-
lish paternity . . . may be instituted only after the birth of the child . . .").
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(d) (1986), GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43(c) (Supp. 1989),
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-6(d) (1985), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(b)(5) (West Supp.
1990).
39. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.9 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 276
(1981); and MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-19 (1973).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (1984).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-103 (1987).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(d) (Supp. 1988).
43. But consider Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (dependency of mar-




"social relationship" between the prospective father and the unborn
child, as well as the biological or marital link.""" Further, prebirth sup-
port orders should not "be turned into an income transfer program
from poor fathers to lawyers and welfare bureaucrats." '45 Nevertheless,
it now seems appropriate to consider expanding the availability of
prebirth paternity actions.4"
C. Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
Besides crimes and coerced conduct, there has been much recent
debate about using prenatal conduct to suspend or terminate maternal
interests in children born alive. Increasingly, a pregnant woman's acts
will trigger loss of parental interests at birth. Loss may be permanent
or temporary; it may be grounded on the view that mom abused or
neglected the fetus,4" or that her prebirth conduct shows she is not now
a fit parent.48 Such maternal abuse or unfitness often involves cocaine,
heroin, or alcohol use during pregnancy; proceedings may now be easier
for the states to initiate with the advent of mandatory reporting laws
for certain physical conditions of newborns.4"
Obviously, a man's relevant prebirth conduct differs significantly.
Yet, the Florida Supreme Court was correct in observing in Richard's
case that a prospective father's prebirth conduct "directly impacts"
upon his future child.50 Specifically, the Florida court noted:
Because prenatal care of the pregnant mother and unborn child is
44. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public
Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 367, 386.
45. Id. at 379.
46. Another coercive measure against men which seeks to prevent harm to the unborn is a
court order of protection where there has been prior physical abuse of an expectant woman. See,
e.g., Gloria C. v. William C., 124 Misc. 2d 313, 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fam. Ct. 1984). A review of
the literature on abuse during pregnancy appears in Bohn, Domestic Violence and Pregnancy, 35
J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 86 (March/April, 1990).
47. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1986)
(heroin use during pregnancy constitutes abuse under child abuse statute); and ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, 802-3, 802-5 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (neglected minor includes a newborn whose blood or
urine contains a controlled substance, and such a minor can be taken into temporary state custody
without a warrant).
48. See, e.g., Matter of "Male" R, 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1979) (excessive
drug use during pregnancy supports a finding of neglect based on the theory that the parent would
not be able to provide adequate care after birth).
49. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2052 (Smith-Hurd 1988) and 2053 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990) (Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act includes newborn whose blood or urine
contains a controlled substance and whose best interests must be protected by a state agency).
50. Doe 11, 543 So. 2d at 746.
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critical ... the biological father, wed or unwed, has a responsibility to
provide support during the prebirth period. Respondent natural fa-
ther's argument that he has no parental responsibility prior to birth
• . . is not a norm that society is prepared to recognize. Such an argu-
ment is legally, morally, and socially indefensible.51
While the Florida court did not err in finding a man has a prebirth
duty of support, it failed to describe the duty adequately, to urge the
legislature to do so, or describe in much detail how Richard breached
it. The court also failed to afford Richard the opportunity to demon-
strate how his later acts in seeking custody of John might have over-
come his earlier failure of support or his abandonment of John. More
importantly, the court and later lawmakers in Florida have failed to
distinguish this duty in settings involving possible criminal prosecution,
financial support orders, and termination of parental rights.
Some better coordination of social policy on prebirth parental du-
ties seems appropriate. Duties for both men and women should be dis-
cussed. The duties imposed in criminal, child support, and termination
of parental rights cases should be jointly considered, though certainly
not equalized. Criminal child abuse, thus, should differ from abuse rel-
evant in a parental rights hearing or from conduct triggering a prebirth
support order. Employing such differentiations, Richard's conduct may
have constituted inadequate financial support, but seemingly was
neither criminal nor sufficient to terminate forever his parental rights.
D. Further Inquires on Paternal Duties
Inquiries into prebirth paternal duties should not simply parallel
current inquiries into the duties of pregnant women. Comprehensive in-
quiries require more.
Consider, for example, putative father registries. Typically, prior
to birth such registries are used by men intending to claim paternity of
children born out of wedlock. 52 Registration usually assures the men of
notice of subsequent adoption proceedings.5" Thus, by registering, men
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. § 372-c (McKinney 1983) (putative father registry contains
names of persons filing notices, before or after birth, of their intent to claim paternity) and UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (Supp. 1990) (those claiming to be fathers of children born outside of
marriage may file a notice of claim of paternity even prior to birth).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. § 111-a (McKinney 1988) (in adoption proceeding involving
child born out-of-wedlock, notice must be given to any person who has timely filed an unrevoked
notice of intent to claim paternity) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (Supp. 1990) (in adoption
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like Richard can better assure their own participation in hearings on
their children's future. Yet, why not allow Mary (or Richard's mom, 4
perhaps after viability) to register Richard's possible fatherhood? Re-
gistration by others could prompt the state to notify the men of their
possible fatherhood and of their legal rights and duties.
More controversial would be fatherhood notice laws. Some parents
must now be told of their child's intent to abort, 5 and some husbands
must now be informed of their wives' similar intent.56 Why not require
pregnant women to notify the prospective fathers of their potential
parenthood? Especially after viability, should notice of possible father-
hood be left solely to maternal discretion and to fortune? Under U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, a natural father's biological link with his
child only affords him the chance to establish constitutionally protected
interests in parenthood; it does not guarantee those interests.5 7 A fa-
ther's constitutional interests in parenthood thus require some affirma-
tive acts beyond procreation." But how can fathers act when they are
uninformed? Obviously, fatherhood notice laws59 require sensitivity to
proceeding, notice must be given to any man who filed a notice of his claim of paternity prior to
the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child-placing agency or before an adoption petition
is filed), whose constitutionality was sustained in Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d 932
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), affd, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (reviewing putative father registry laws of
other states).
54. Usually, the family members of new parents are keenly interested in the welfare of their
new relations. See. e.g., Wylie, 416 So. 2d at 1255 (a new mother's mother and stepfather seem-
ingly prompt the new mother and the new father to seek to halt an adoption earlier agreed upon).
55. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 419 (1981) (a parental notice requirement does not
constitute per se an invalid burden on a minor's right to make an abortion decision); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, I 10 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (majority finds a two-parent notice law constitutional).
56. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (spousal notice law not addressed); Scheinberg
v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 667 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1981) (a Florida
spousal notice law could be constitutional); Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Board of Med-
ical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625 (D.R.I. 1984) (a R.I. spousal notice law is unconstitutional); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (1989 spousal notice law).
57. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) ("The significance of the biological con-
nection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring.").
58. Exemplary of such action is a court adjudication of fatherhood, the filing with the state
of a notice of intent to claim paternity, an acknowledgment of paternity on the birth certificate,
marriage to the mother at or shortly after birth, and cohabitation with the mother and child with
declarations of fatherhood. Id. at 251 n.5 (conduct triggering the right to receive notice of an
adoption proceeding in New York).
59. For a proposal protecting a natural father's right to know of his parenthood in a setting
where a child born out-of-wedlock is the subject of an adoption petition, see Note, The Unwed
Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 1002 n.407 (1987-88).
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mothers' interests in privacy"° as well as to fathers' parenting interests.
Finally, consider laws promoting informed and conscious decision-
making about parenting. Many laws provide that doctors or others
must convey certain information to women considering abortion.61 Why
not require that prospective parents be given information on beneficial
prebirth conduct, and perhaps on prebirth parental duties?62 With such
laws, men like Richard would be better informed of the consequences
and expectations resulting from their procreative conduct. Recent laws
requiring warning labels on cigarette packages6" and whiskey bottles64
simply do not go far enough in promoting greater sensitivity to the risks
posed to future generations by present conduct, and do little to inform
.prospective parents about their legal duties.
As understanding of the reproductive process grows and as new
reproductive technologies develop, additional laws on paternal duties
will be in order. Likely to soon require consideration are laws involving
dangers posed to the procreative potential of men at the workplace, 6
laws on paternal rights when artificial insemination is employed in very
60. Such privacy interests include a woman's "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" (the right to be let alone) and her "interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions" (the right to decide without state interference matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education). Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). At least some sensitivity to such interests is found in Pennsylvania's
spousal notice law regarding abortion. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Purdon Supp. 1990)
(married woman need not notify spouse of upcoming abortion if her spouse is not the potential
father, and unmarried woman granted more decisionmaking independence as she is not required
to notify the potential father of the upcoming abortion).
61. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976) (legiti-
mate state interest in assuring that the decision to abort, an important and often a stressful one,
be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (ordinance overturned as it specified "a litany
of information that the physician must recite to each woman," including "a parade of horribles
intended to suggest abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure"); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
3205(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (new informed consent law as earlier law was invalidated in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) because of its
anti-abortion character).
62. Consider N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457.23 (Supp. 1989) (both parties seeking a mar-
riage license must be given a brochure concerning fetal alcohol syndrome).
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a) (West Supp. 1990).
64. 27 U.S.C.A. § 215(a) (West Supp. 1990).
65. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1219, 1245 (1986). Of course, comparable dangers to women have received much attention since
the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear a case about the effects of a manufacturer's fetal vulner-
ability policies on women. International Union, UAW v. Johnson, Controls, Inc. 886 F.2d 871
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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private settings (where no outsiders are involved),66 and laws involving




The case of Richard, Mary, John, the Does, and their lawyers is
troubling. In focusing on the legal treatment of prospective fathers, this
article urges that prebirth paternal duties be considered as prebirth
maternal duties are considered. Laws on prebirth parental duties
should differentiate between men and women, as well as between such
diverse settings as crimes, child support, and parental rights
termination.
66. In these settings, the general rule that the donor is not a parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception, Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, § 4, re-
printed in 15 Fam. L. Rep. 2009, 2011 (BNA 1989), is often found overcome because of the
understanding of the participants. See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (semen donor
may have parental rights where unmarried recipient agreed to recognize his paternity) and McIn-
tyre v. Crouch, 98 Ore. App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989), cert. denied 109 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1990)
(same conclusion).
67. Consider tort duties for fertile men regarding the safeguarding of their sperm supply or
the possibility of a so-called preconception tort action based on a third-party's interference with a
man's procreative potential. Compare Olsen, Unravelling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105,
129 (1989) (discussing a law forbidding men to ejaculate outside a fertile woman's vagina) and
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 II1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (injured child sues hospi-
tal for negligent blood transfusion to the mother years earlier).
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